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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
TORTS-NECESSITY OF PLEADING OBLIVIOUSNESS UNDER HUMANITARIAN
DocTRiNE-[Missouri].-If a man is in a position of peril, obliviousness
need not be separably proved, and no instruction is necessary. Suppose he
is merely approaching a position of peril. Is obliviousness then so essential
to the condition of "imminent peril" that the defendant is entitled to an
instruction requiring the jury to find obliviousness? The Supreme Court of
Missouri, in Perkins v. Terminal R. R. Assoc. of St. Louis,' has answered
this question in the negative, by refusing the defendant an instruction of
this nature. The instruction given by the court authorized a verdict for the
plaintiff merely upon a finding that he was approaching a position of "im-
minent peril."
Previous to this case, the law in Missouri was apparently well settled
that in order to rely on the humanitarian doctrine,2 when the case depended
upon obliviousness, the plaintiff must establish (1) that the defendant saw
or knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have seen or known
plaintiff's peril; and (2) that defendant saw or knew, or by the exercise
of ordinary care could have seen or known that plaintiff was oblivious of
that peril.3 The plaintiff could never make out a case under this doctrine
(unless he was in an inextricable position) without proving these two con-
stituent elements of liability.
In the case of Pentecost v. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal R. R.
Co.,' the court sustained a demurrer to the evidence where the plaintiff was
not oblivious of the approach of the train. They said that in the absence of
obliviousness, the defendant was not negligent, under the humanitarian
rule, even for its failure to sound the whistle. The majority opinion of the
Perkins case says the Pentecost case is not in point because it involved a
demurrer to the evidence, while the Perkins case involves the propriety of
an instruction. In other words, the majority judges do not deny the neces-
sity of obliviousness, but distinguish the two cases for technical reasons.
The requirement that the plaintiff be oblivious of his peril (or be unable
to extricate himself) was adopted by the courts because they felt that the
law should not go so far as to excuse a plaintiff's contributory negligence
when he knew of his peril and could have escaped, but nevertheless per-
mitted the defendant negligently to injure him.5 Judge Graves in Laun v.
1. 102 S. W. (2d) 915 (Mo. 1937).
2. For a discussion of the humanitarian doctrine in Missouri see Gaines,
The Humanitarian Doctrine in Missouri (1935) 20 ST. Louis LAW REVIEW
113, 120; Otis, The Humanitarian Doctrine (1912) 46 Am. Law Review 381;
Clark, Tort Liability for Negligence in Missouri (1916) 12 Mo. Law Bull.
3, 34; note 92 A. L. R. 47; 45 C. J. Negligence (1928) 984-995, sees. 539-
545.
3. State ex rel. Lusk v. Ellison, 271 Mo. 463, 196 S. W. 1088 (1917);
Rashall v. Railroad, 249 Mo. 509, 155 S. W. 426 (1913); Gabal v. Railroad,
251 Mo. 257, 158 S. W. 12 (1913). While these particular cases relate to
section hands, and while liability as to a section hand does not apply until
he is actually seen in imminent peril and oblivion, yet the principle is the
same.
4. 66 S. W. (2d) 533 (1933).
5. Kinlen v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 216 Mo. 145, 164, 115 S. W. 523 (1909);
Pope v. Wabash R. R. Co., 242 Mo. 232, 239, 146 S. W. 790 (1912) ; Reeves
v. K. C., St. Louis & Chi. R. R. Co., 251 Mo. 169, 177, 158 S. W. 2 (1913) ;
19371
Washington University Open Scholarship
582 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22
St. Louis, S. F. R. R. Co.,6 said that the plaintiff "has no right to race with
death that way."
The leading case on the subject in Missouri is Banks v. Morris & Co.7
The prevailing opinion in the Perkins case cites the Banks case as authority
for the proposition that obliviousness is not essential. Actually, the Banks
case only held that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead obliviousness.
It was admitted in that case s that if obliviousness is the cause of the im-
minent peril, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove his obliviousness. This
holding is based on the common knowledge that a normal person is not in
imminent peril, practically, so long as he can escape. If interpreted other-
wise, the Banks case would be a precedent for a rule permitting plaintiff's
recovery, whatever the cause of his peril, be it even his own sheer reckless-
ness. The same judge who wrote the Banks case opinion, also wrote Clark
v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., wherein it is said: "If Clark saw the train
coming or knew that it was coming, he was not in a position of peril."0
Judge Ellison, in his dissenting opinion in the Perkins case,10 upholds the
defendant's contention that the instruction should have required the jury
to find the respondent was oblivious; for otherwise the law would exact
absolutely nothing of the plaintiff. Judge Gantt" in a separate dissenting
opinion says that the plaintiff could not have been approaching a position
of imminent peril at the time of the collision. Neither could he have been
approaching imminent peril and in imminent peril at the same time. "If
the instruction means anything it conveys the idea that the appellant owed
him a duty while he was approaching imminent peril, and that is not the
law even under the Banks case."
Much can be said for Judge Ellison's dissent. There are no degrees of
imminent peril under the humanitarian doctrine.12 The plaintiff is either
in peril or he is not. The zone of peril may be enlarged by plaintiff's oblivi-
ousness, but that only means he is in a position of imminent peril sooner.
It is illogical to ask the jury to find whether the plaintiff was approach-
ing imminent peril, and oblivious at the same time. The sole issue should
be whether the plaintiff was in actual or apparent imminent peril, and the
defendant knew or should have known it in time to save him.
It is submitted that the courts in this state have already gone too far
with the humanitarian doctrine, and ought not to go still farther. This
case extends the doctrine by holding a defendant liable merely because he
State ex rel. St. Louis, S. F. R. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 289 Mo. 479, 492, 233
S. W. 219 (1921) ; Alexander v. St. Louis, S. F. R. R. Co., 289 Mo. 599, 618,
233 S. W. 44 (1921) ; Butler v. United Rys. Co., 293 Mo. 259, 238 S. W. 1077
(1922).
6. 216 Mo. 563, 580, 116 S. W. 553 (1909).
7. 302 Mo. 254, 268, 257 S. W. 482 (1924).
8. Ibid.
9. 6 S. W. (2d) 954, 960 (Mo. 1928).
10. Perkins v. Terminal R. R. Assoc. of St. Louis, 102 S. W. (2d) 915
(Mo. 1937).
11. Ibid.
12. Gaines, The Humanitarian Doctrine in Missouri (1935) 20 ST. Louis
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ought to have seen the plaintiff approaching a position of imminent peril,
and regardless of whether plaintiff was oblivious. If carried to the extreme,
the practical effect of this ruling will be to force the trains to "stop, look
and listen" for approaching autos.
A. K. S.
UNFAIR COMPETITION-REOGNITION OF PROPERTY RIGHT IN IDEAS AND
M THODS-[Federal].-The plaintiff had originated the advertising plan
"Bank Night," and had expended money and effort in its promotion, deriv-
ing profit by licensing its use.' The defendant was engaged in licensing a
similar scheme. The plaintiff sued to restrain defendant from unfair com-
petition in appropriating its alleged property right in the system. The bill
was dismissed on the grounds that to sustain the bill would result in a
monopoly and that plaintiff's property right in the system was lost when
disclosed to the public.2
The courts have found the extent of protection to be accorded this type
of business scheme an extremely perplexing problem.3 While recognition
of property rights in economically valuable ideas and methods has fre-
quently been sought, courts have been reluctant to extend such recognition.4
The early common law was in conflict as to property in purely intellectual
creations.5 However a "reduction to practice '"6 of an idea is apparently
1. The plaintiff licensed or vended the plan to commercial establishments,
especially motion picture theatres. The plan involved the award of a prize
at stated periods to the patron or person whose name was drawn from a
receptacle in which the names or serial numbers of all patrons or registered
persons were contained. The lower court's dismissal of the bill on the
ground that the plan was a gambling transaction was held erroneous on
this appeal. This comment is not concerned with the legality of the sys-
tem. See comment, 22 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 126 (1936).
2. Affiliated Enterprises, Inc., v. Truber et al., 86 F. (2d) 958 (C. C. A. 1,
1936). The plaintiff also alleged infringement of its copyrights on its in-
structions and publications. The allegations of infringement were held
insufficient.
3. Handler, Unfair Competition (1936) 21 Iowa L. Rev. 175, 190; note
47 Harv. L. Rev. 1419 (1934).
4. Globe Wernick Co. v. Fred Macey Co., 119 Fed. 696 (C. C. A. 6, 1902)(system of sectional bookcases); Einstadt Mfg. Co. v. J. M. Fisher Co., 232
Fed. 957 (D. C. D. R. I., 1916), aff'd 241 Fed. 241 (C. C. A. 1, 1917)
(bracelet to be built by purchase of individual links); Harvey Hubbell,
Inc., v. General Electric Co., 262 Fed. 155 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1919)
(interchangeable electric sockets); Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co.,
216 Fed. 401 (C. C. W. D. Mich., 1908) (manufacturing methods).
5. Compare Lord Mansfield's holding in Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303,
2311, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 253 (1769) with Lord Brougham's opinion in Jeffery
v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 814, 965, 10 Eng. Rep. 681, 740 (1854). See also
Rogers, A Chapter in the History of Literary Property (1911) 5 Ill. L. Rev.
550.
6. A "reduction to practice" involves the employing of the abstraction
in a definite concrete form as a source of profit in business. Note, 47 Harv.
L. Rev. 1419 (1934); note, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 258 (1929).
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